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Was the US a colonial power? Neo-colonialism is where one country through
economic policies dominates another country or people. This differs from old
colonialism, where the dominating country took direct political control of another
country. While it can safely be said that the United States did not eng4ge in old
colonialism to the same extent as some European countries, it cannot safely be said that
the United States did not engage in neo-colonialism. The fact is that the US has
indirectly, through the economic force of US companies, held control over other
countries. Some times the US government is not the initiator of neo-colonialisnr, but
whether the domination was started by the government or a company the fact is that the
US is a neo-colonial master. To demonstrde howthis neo-colonialism works, one can
look at the United Fruit Company (UFCO). LIFCO took economic domination to a new
level in the areas it influenced in Central America and the Caribbean. Not only did
UFCO cause sovereign nations economies to be almost entirely under their control,
UFCO also caused coupes that ousted freely elected governments because they didn't like
the government's policies. UFCO wasn't dragged by the US government into neo-
colonialism, but instead drug the US government into the position of neo-colonial master.
It is the relationship between UFCO and local peoples, and the relationship between
UFCO and the US government which is the topic of this paper. This paper will show that
UFCO through its domination of Central America and the Caribbean playd puppet
master over governments and peoples, all for the sake of putting exotic fruit on the table
of Americans.
It is not clear when the first bananas where brought to the US, by captains sailing
down to Central America and back. In 1866 Carl B. Frank imported the first bananas
from Colon panama to New York.r This was the first time that bananas were a deliberate
cargo, prior all bananas that made it to the US were those that captains were able to fit
after actual cargo was loaded. In 1876 bananas were sold at the Philadelphia Centennial
Exposition of American Independence for lOcents each.2 After Americans got their first
taste of the long, yellow, exotic, fruit they were hooked. Capt- l,orenzo Dow Baker,
captain ofthe fishing schooner Tetegraphbegan selling his bananas to Andrew Preston in
Boston. Preston would then sell the bananas to the public. In f 885 Preston and Baker
formed the Boston Fruit Company.' This company would later join forces with an
American industrialist already building railroads and conducting shipping operations,
Minor Keith. Keith was already a wealthy man after building a railroad in Costa Rica,
and marring the daughter of the President of Costa Rica. On March 30, 1899 Preston,
Keittr, and Baker joined forces and created the United Fruit Company.u This merger
created the single largest fruit cornpany in the world. It grew shipped and sold 77Yo of
the bananas in the US.5 To give some sense of scale in 189816 million stems were
brought to the US.6 In 1910 UFCO was reported by the New York Times as being worth
$6,552,576, most ofthis from the sail of bananas.' This shows just how much Americans
had corne to love this tropical fruit. The business was booming and UFCO was taking
advantage it.
In 1910 the company was importing workers &om Jamaica to Costa Rica, because
the company could bring Jamaicans in for less than it cost to hire Costa Ricans.s The
cooler mountains of Costa Rica were perfect for growing Coffee, and this drove the price
for farm workers up in the country. Why would a Costa Rican move to the coast to make
less money than they were in the coffee plantations? The answer is they wouldn't. Why
would a company pay workers more than they have to? Again, they wouldn't' So what
you,re left with is Jamaicans coming to Costa Rica to work in these banana plantations
owned by UFCO. In Jamaica at the time the island was being used to grow srrgar for the
Englistr, since Jamaica was still a colony of Great Brittan at thetime. The result was the
second orthird generation of free blacks on the island, slavery was banned in the 1830's
for the British Empire, needed a place to go where they could earn some money'' The
sugar plantations on the island paid low wages, and there was little food since most all
the arid able land was being put into sugar production. As a viable alternative Jamaicans
choose to immigrate to Central America and work in the banana plantations. This created
an island an English speaking society in the middle of Spanish speaking Central America.
It is not surprising that many of the workers felt closer allied with their supervisors, who
also spoke Englistr, than with fellow workers in Costa Rica. Between 1900 and 1913,
20,000 Jamaicans immigrated to Costa Rica to work in the banana industry.r0 It should
be noted that not all the workers who worked for UFCO, including Jamaicans, worked in
the banana fields. UFCO also had ships and railroads to run as well has schools and
hospitals, so not all the workers necessarily went into the banana fields to work.
Even though so many carne and worted ficr UFCO not all of the workers were
satisfied with the way the company treated them. Many in fact felt they had been lied to
by UFCO when they were told about what work was like before they left Jamaica.rl One
thing that bothered the Jamaican workers was, the company paid them in script instead of
actual dollars or any other government issued money. This meant that the workers could
not send money back to their families in Jamaicq if they w€re so inclined to do so- This
created a problem with other stores becausg any store not owned and operated by UFCO
would only redeem the script for Z}-25Yoless than what the script was said to be worth. 
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Imagine if you only got T5cents out of each dollar you spent when you weot to certain
stores, but if you go to the right stores you get the full dollar. In this case the right store
was the UFCO store. With this sort of arrangement the company controlled the lives of
the workers. If the worker wanted to leave the systenr, they would have limle to no cash
in their pockets. This created a sort of prison for the workers, not just Jamaican but also
the local workers and in any country UFCO operated in. Striking was also not an option
when working for IJFCO. In 1904 seven dock workers decided they were fed up with the
way the company was treating them. They decided to just stop working, and demand
bettertreatment from the company. Within hours UFCO brought in 165 workers who
had been doing other things to complete the work of the seven.l' The employees were
not beaten or anything like that by the company, but they were shown without a doubt
that if anyone decided to strike while working forUFCO they could easily be replaced.
The company didn't even skip a beat. One thing that did help the workers cope with the
disappointing working conditions was the culture they came from. Remember most of
these workers were only one or two generations removed from slavery- This enabled
them to develop many ofthe same coping mechanisms used by the slaves- They created
a sense of community and underground connections.la
Workers were just one way in which the UFCO controlled the countries it
operated in. Another way UFCO controlled countries in an economic sense was the use
of land. It is safe to say that prior to the banana industry the amount of plant species, in
any area in which TIFCO operated, was much more biologically diverse- The benefit of
having biological diversity is the land is better suited to supply the needs of people living
on it. Take for example the great potato famine in Ireland. ffthe kish would have grown
more varieties of food to diversifu there diet, then when the blight hit the potatoes it
wouldn't have caused as big of a problem. The same thing happened with the bananas.
Bananas are very susceptible to diseaseg for this reason up until about the 1960's banana
growing was an almost migratory thing. 
t5 The disease hit the banana crop was the
panama Disease, and there was no cure for it. One engineer for UFCO said this,
"The Panama Disease used to kill everything. The only solution \ilas to get hold
of new lands. It was not possible to maintain bananas once the disease struck. So
when one farm died offanother was planted, one would die another was
planted... That's how we ended up in Ecuador."l6
This quote shows us a couple things. Bananas required constant acquisition of land,
because there always had to be somewhere that the disease hadn't gone yet for the next
banana farm. Remember, in 1910 the banana import business was a multi million dollar
industry. Notice next time you're in a grocery store how many bananas there are. All
these fruits have to come from somewhere and priorto the 1960's the demand could not
be met by simply managing the crop lands already in production.
This obviously led UFCO and other banana companies to constantly expand and
take even more farmable land out of commission for domestic needs. The quote also
shows that UFCO was not bound by national boundary, after all UFCO was an American
company that had been incorporated in New Jersey. This meant that if a country wanted
to keep UFCO because so much of there economy was based on the banana trade which
UFCO controlled; the government had to make certain allowances forthe company. In
l9l4 John Ewing was the minister in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. He said this when writing
"fully and frankly concerning all maters that enter into or tend to control the internal
political situation and condition s here [Honduras]," to the state department.
"I would not be reporting unreservedly if I failed to direct the attention of the
Department to a source which is an ever present factor, I speak ofthe United Fruit
Company and its subsidiaries and its railroad connections... in orderto obtain
these concessions and privileges and to secure their undisturbed enjoyment, it
TUFCO] has seen fit to enter actively into the internal politics ofthese countries,
and it has pursued this course so systematically and regularly until it now has its
ramifications in every department of the government and is a most important facto
in all political movements and actions." 
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This shows you the sort of power UFCO had over these different countries it operated in.
Again, this power was brought around by the IIFCO's constant need to expand and
obtain new land because any farm land that had been hit by the Panama Disease was
wasted. To go against th€ UFCO was certainly trying to swim up stream against a might
river. It is important to note that at this point the US's policy was basically hands off,
since the Central American countries were sovereign they were free to allow US
companies and US markets to rule there politics.
See that's how neo-colonialism starts. First a company comes in and begins
growing in the economy of its host country until it becomes so large that the host country
can't stop it. The will of the American consumer, or any other conzumer ofthe goods
produced by the American company, drive the compary to seek a profit- In the
company's effort to create a profit by providing goods to the markets they begin to 
need
political actions to help ease their efforts. This leads inevitably to investors and
consumers in the home country, in this case the US, demanding that US interests become
those of the US Company, in this case UpCO. Edward W. Ames an agent of the US
State Department said this in l9l9 when President Francisco Bertrand of Honduras began
to chafe under the control of UFCO on his country'r8
*There is, in my opiniorq one and only one logical way to prevent a very senous
outbreak [revolution] in Honduras between now and the end of October, 
viz: for
the US government to say politely but firmly to President Bertrand that we put
him where he is, that we expect certain things of hirn, that he is not meeting these
expectations and that wg therefore, want him to step down and out for the
obvious good of his country [Honduras]."re
This was not an isolated incident; instead it was standard operating procedure for the US
State Department. What could these politicians in US dependent countries do? They
wanted to provide the best possible life for their people, assuming they were sensitive to
the cries oftheir own people. They also couldn't afford to go against UFCO and the us
government even when it came to their own domestic affairs. If they asked UFCO to
leave, and assuming UFCO consented, it would have ruined their economy- The fields
were already destroyed by Panama Disease and many people in their country would have
worked for UFCO. On the flip side UFCO is forcing laws that kept the workers poor, the
Americans rich and the politicians bound. The only thing to do was to watch the wealth
of their country slip away, and try to stay in power. When politicians did rise up against
the UFCO the US government was ready and willing to handle the situation on behalf of
the companies. Perhaps the best example of this taking place is the coupe orchestrated by
the US in Guatemala in 1954.
In lg44 Jose Arevalo took control of Guatemala and began to move the country
away fromthe gnp of UFCO and other foreign companies operating in the country.
Arevalo was the first popularly elected president in Guatemalan history, and that didn't
sit well with UFCO.'0 Jose Arevalo may not have been UFCO's favorite leader but it was
Arevalo's successor that would bring the wrath of UFCO and the US down on
Guatemala.
In 1951 Jacob Arbenz was elected President of Guatemala. Arbe.nz had been a
military hero of the 1944 coup that brought free elections to the country ." ln lg52
Arbenz in an attempt to loosen UFCO's on the country nationalized the company. This
of course upset UFCO and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the
action to be the first signs of communism in Guatemala.t' This was the beginning of the
end for Arbenz, because it put him toe to toe with the UFCO and the US government.
It is important to note the relationships between UFCO and the US government,
particularly the Eisenhower administration, in order to fully understand and appreciate
the situation that was developing in Guatemala. Edward Bernay, UFCO's Public
Relations conzultant, was friends was US Congressman John McCormack @) from
Massachusetts, and Senator Alexander Wiley (R) from Wisconsin. 
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relationship is not unexpected, between men of economic power and men of political
power. h lg47 UFCO hired as a professional lobbyist in washington Dc Thomas G.
Corcoran. Corcoran had been an advisor to Franklin Roosevelt during the Great
Depression.'o In the 1940's, during World War II, Corcoran had brought together Sam
Zemurray, the head ofUF'CO, andNelsonRockefeller to discus the possibility of
bringing workers in from South America to the southern US to help ease the labor
shortage.25 These relations in themselves don't really amount to muctr, but the fact that
UFCO and the officials of the us government were working close$ together did lead to
other less innocent relationships. In 1952 Corcoran made the remark that with his friends
in Washingtorq which included head ofthe CIA" he had the finest, "intelligence service in
Washington."26 Cor@ran had also been an advisor to Air Transport Company which was
a front for the CIA. Air Transport would later change their name to Air America and be
very active in Vietnam running operations for the ClA.27 In short UFCO's hiring of
Corcoran was a very calculated move by UFCO to get strong connections with the US
government.
Besides the direct connections UFCO also embarked on a public relations battle to
win over the hearts and minds ofthe American people. The success of this public
relations effort would ensure that the US people would interpret any actions taken against
UFCO as being part of a communist plot to take over Central America. Not actually
influenced by UFCO, Daniel James wrote Red Designfor the Americas, in which he
outlined what he believed the strategies ofthe communists to be for Central America.
James, editor was John Da5 a journalist with ties to the CIA. UFCO bought several
copies of the book and distributed it to influential people in the media.28 The main thesis
of this book was, communists want to take over Central America so they can threaten the
US. This thesis worked perfectly forUFCO who was trying to combat the socialist, but
not communist, policies of Arbenz. On Wednesday April zl't 1954, the New York Times
ran an article which said that the gOvernment of Guatemalawas accusing the Roman
Catholic Church of working against the government.2e The article also asserted that the
reason the catholic Archbishop was acting against the government was because the
government was taking a Marxist line in many of its positions. This sort of story being
published in the New York Times, coupled with stories like that which ran on April 27ft
just convinced the public even more of the communist plot to take over the world. The
article that ran on April 276 talked about the US suing Guatemala for over 15 million
dollars on behalf of uFCo.30 with alt this kind of publicity saylng that the Guaternalan
government was now being run by the cornrnunists, the US government, with strong ties
to UFCO, was forced to act. This was the Cold War and being easy on communism cost
elections and political Power.
John Dulles, the Secretary of state and a former advisor to UFCO, directed his
brother Allerl director of the CIA to topple the Arbenz regime in 1954.31 This overthrow
was according to the Dulles brothers to make Guatemala be in good standing with the
..free world." In 1953 Walter Bedell Smith was moved by Eisenhower from the CIA to
Undersecretary of State under John Dulles." The stage was starting to be made for the
coup. Corcoran began being the go betwe,en for IJFCO and the Cld since in Corcoran's
words.
"We [UFCO] always had to be careful. We had to know what was 
going on but
we couldn't be in on it because if the plan failed, this could hurt us' We knew
what was going on but we didn't want to get involved. The Fruit Company didn't
refuse to tell the CIA what it thought, but it oouldn't afford to let itself be caught-"
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The funny thing about this quote is that it muddies the water as far as who is working for
whom. UFCO definitely had a vested interest in the overthrow of Arbenz but it's also
possible that the CIA actually believed that Arbenz was a communist and was leading to
the fall of Central America to the Russians.
On June 18ft 1954 Carlos Castillo Armas, the man the CIA was going to put in
power, began the coup. The trucks rolled and the men set out from staging points along
the Honduras border. One of the stagrng areas was even a UFCO plantation.3u The CIA's
pilots also began their work in the invasion plan. They were supposed to bomb targets in
Guatemala, in orderto help weaken the defenses ofthe Arbenz government. By Sunday
June 27ft at 9:15 addressed Guatemala, although it is not known how many heard the
message since the CIA was jamming the srgnal, and told his countrymen that he was
leaving the presidency.3s Armes after mopping up the remaining resistance took the
presidency and restored the land that Arbenz had taken from UFCO back to the company.
The UFCO is a good example of how the US engaged in neo-colonialism- First
the company went into Central America and the Caribbean; they bought up huge tracks of
land. This land was then transformed into a mono-crop plantation designed to feed the
veracious appetite of Americans. Workers were brought in to provide cheap labor in
ord€r to increase the profits for share holders. When the workers tried to resist the
company used its overwhelming resources to compensate. The company also ensured
that the workers were paid in script so as to exude even more control. When the US
realized that UFCO was becoming so powerful and starting to dictate politics to these
Central American countries the US just turned a blind eye. It worked on behalf of the
American company to make sure that the US profited by the misfortunes of the oppressed
people in the other countries. Finally when UFCO was threatened the US put an end to
the freely elected government that was harming the company, and replaced the elected
government with a dictatorship. The US may have never been a traditional colonial
master like its European neighbors, but it has engaged in neo-colonialism on the same
scale. US companies still have a lot of power over the countries they operate iq and neo-
colonialism is still alive. It may not be to the same extreme as the United Fruit company
took it to. After all, United Fruit made neo-colonialism into an art. The answer to the
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